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Warmatrix

War Matrix - Battle of Teutoburg Forest

Roman Ascent 200 BCE - 120 CE, Battles and sieges

Fury of the Goths (actually applies to the Battle of the Sabis)
Fury of the Goths (actually applies to the Battle of the Sabis)
The Battle of the Teutoburg Forest in 9 BCE was one of the worst defeats of the Roman army. It was not a normal battle but an ambush where the Germans used terrain and weather with devastating effect.
In the three decades before the battle, in response to Germanic raids, the Romans had pushed deep into Germany. In 4 CE emperor Augustus ordered his armies to finally conquer Germania and make it into a province of the empire. The conquest was more or less complete two years later, but like other barbarian areas annexed earlier, Germany remained rebellious. In 9 CE Publius Quinctilius Varus, a ruthless commander, was busy pacifying the region. Due to larger uprisings in the Balkans, he was assigned only three legions.
Varus' guide in Germany was a Cherusci chieftain named Arminius. He and his brother had been sent to Rome as hostages by their father and received military education there. Arminius became a trusted advisor of Varus, but his real loyalties secretly remained with his own people. He gathered an alliance of Cherusci, Marsi, Chatti, Bructeri, Chauci, Sicambri and Suebi. When Varus was on his way to his winter camp, Arminius fabricated fake reports of a rebellion. Varus immediately moved to clamp down on it. Arminius and several other German leaders soon left the army, took command of the other side and ambushed the Romans in the Teutoburg Forest.
The Roman army numbered 3 legions, 6 cohorts of auxiliaries and 3 alae of cavalry, more than 20,000 men in total. At a certain moment it was advancing westward near Kalkriese hill. Because the Romans thought they were still in friendly territory, it was in marching order, stretched out thin, possibly 9 miles long, over a 15 - 20 mile long narrow path that was made muddy by rain. Suddenly the Germans attacked them from the sides. The heavy armor of the Romans was a hindrance in the mud, their bowstrings slackened from the rain, their shields were waterlogged and their pila were blocked by trees. In contrast, the Germans wore little armor and wielded swords and short spears. They inflicted heavy losses, but part of the Roman army managed to set up a night camp and hold out, despite being attacked constantly.
The next morning, the Romans broke out to more open country in the southeast. On the third day they turned around and headed northwest again, following a more northernly route. However Arminius had blocked the narrow passage between Kalkriese hill and a great bog with a wall and a ditch. The Romans tried to storm it, but failed. The counteratttack that followed wiped them out.
Roman losses are estimated at 15,000 - 20,000, including soldiers fallen in battle, others captured and many officers having committed suicide, including Varus. Soon afterwards, all Roman strongholds east of the Rhine were reduced. Emperor Augustus, on hearing of the defeat, is reported to have exclaimed "Quintili Vare, legiones redde!" ('Quintilius Varus, give me back my legions!'). In the decade after the battle, the Romans retaliated by launching several raids into Germany, defeating the Germans and pillaging heavily. But they never made an attempt to conquer the area again. Instead, they held the Rhine as a border and interfered with German politics indirectly through client kings.